

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CHARLES D. SEGROVES,
Petitioner,
vs.
NEVADA BOARD OF PAROLE
COMMISSIONERS,
Respondent.

No. 78825-COA

FILED

JUN 25 2019

ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY S. Young
DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER DENYING PETITION


In this original petition for a writ of mandamus, Charles D. Segroves challenges the computation of time he has served and asserts the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners has relied on inaccurate information and inapplicable factors when considering him for parole, in violation of his due process rights. Segroves seeks an order finding the Board violated his due process rights when considering him for parole in the past and directing the Board to comply with statutory and due process rights when conducting parole proceedings.

We conclude Segroves has failed to demonstrate this court's intervention by way of extraordinary relief is warranted. See NRS 34.160; NRS 34.170; NRAP 21(b)(1); *Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004) ("Petitioner[] carr[ies] the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted."). A postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the district court in the county in which the petitioner is incarcerated "[i]s the only remedy available to an incarcerated person to challenge the computation of time that the person has served pursuant to a judgment of conviction." NRS 34.724(2)(c); see NRS 34.738(1). Further, because Segroves' challenges to the factors relied

on to deny him parole involve issues of fact, he should seek relief in the district court in the first instance. *See Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman*, 97 Nev. 601, 604, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981). Accordingly, without deciding upon the merits of any claims raised, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.


_____, C.J.
Gibbons


_____, J.
Tao


_____, J.
Bulla

cc: Charles D. Segroves
Attorney General/Carson City
Attorney General/Dep't of Public Safety/Carson City