

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JORGE GONZALEZ,
Appellant,
vs.
PAULA GONZALEZ,
Respondent.

No. 42618

FILED

JAN 06 2009

JANETTE M BLOOM
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY *J. Richards*
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is a proper person appeal from a post-decree order concerning appellant's child support obligation. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; Cheryl B. Moss, Judge.


This court reviews a child support order for abuse of discretion.¹ A district court's judgment will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.² Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to modify appellant's child support obligation. Moreover, to the extent that appellant is appealing from the portion of the district court order regarding arrears, this portion of the order is not substantively appealable because the district court merely determined the amount of arrears and structured a payment for the purpose of enforcing the child support


¹Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 922 P.2d 541 (1996).


²Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 865 P.2d 328 (1993).

obligation under the 2001 divorce decree.³ Thus, the order is not a special order after final judgment, because it does not affect the rights or liabilities of any party flowing from the divorce decree, it just enforces the decree.⁴ Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

 J.
Maupin

 J.
Douglas

 J.
Parraguirre

cc: Hon. Cheryl B. Moss, District Judge, Family Court Division
Clark County District Attorney David J. Roger,
Family Support Division
Jorge Gonzalez
Clark County Clerk

³See NRS 125B.140 (providing that the district court has the authority to enforce orders for support); Khaldy v. Khaldy, 111 Nev. 374, 377, 892 P.2d 584, 586 (1995) (observing that once payments for child support have accrued they become vested rights and cannot be modified or voided).

⁴Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 59 P.3d 1220 (2002) (clarifying that a special order made after final judgment must affect the rights of some party to the action, growing out of the previous judgment).